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Introduction
In many jobs, not all aspects of employee performance are objectively measurable. Therefore, organizations frequently use subjective performance evaluations to measure the employees'contribution. Gibbs et al. (2003) , for instance, have argued that the use of subjectivity in performance evaluation can strengthen incentive setting as more facets of the job can be appraised. On the other hand the use of subjective components in evaluations raises issues of rating bias which can cause substantial ine¢ ciencies (see for instance Prendergast and Topel (1993) , Murphy and Cleveland (1995) , or Moers (2005) ). In a subjective assessment "human judges other humans" (Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) ) which for instance may open the door to favoritism, so that supervisors can follow their personal social preferences and bias the outcome of the evaluation. A biased performance evaluation can, for instance, lead to an ine¢ cient allocation of workers to tasks or jobs (Prendergast and Topel (1996) ) or to a failure to identify training needs of employees when they are judged too leniently. Therefore it is important to investigate potential distortions in subjective evaluations in a real organizational context and thus to contribute to the progress of "understanding how subjective assessments are made" (Prendergast (1999) ).
Our aim is to shed some light on the question whether and why subjective performance evaluations are distorted using a unique data set from a call center organization. A typical problem of studying performance appraisal data is that distortions are hard to detect as the true performance is typically not observable to the researcher (see for instance the discussion in Kane et al. (1995) ). Hence, it is hard to measure whether an employee received a good appraisal because of good performance or whether the appraisal was biased for instance due to favoritism or social preferences. A key feature of our data set is that besides the subjective evaluation we observe a number of more objective measures of performance. But more importantly, in the company we study, employees move between teams and supervisors quite frequently, which helps us to identify reasons for biased evaluations.
A key observation in the literature is that performance appraisals tend to be too lenient. Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Prendergast (2002) analyze subjective appraisals in economic models assuming that supervisors, while having some intrinsic preference for accurately reporting the true performance, also care for the welfare of their subordinates. This leads to a basic tradeo¤ between accuracy and leniency and it directly results that evalutions are the more lenient, the stronger the supervisor's social preferences towards the evaluated subordinate. Based on this reasoning, we now argue that a closer social attachment between supervisor and subordinate should lead to better performance ratings even when there are no di¤erences in true performance. We use two proxies for social ties. First, we suppose that the strength of the personal relationship between supervisor and subordinate depends on the size of the group evaluated. We therefore analyze the e¤ect of work unit size on the result of subjective evaluations and expect more lenient results for smaller units where the personal contact is closer. Second, we expect more lenient ratings for employees who have worked for the same supervisor a longer period of time. It is of course important to stress that we control for objective measures of performance, employee speci…c …xed e¤ects, as well as prior job experience to exclude that the results are driven simply by di¤erences in productivity.
A key underlying assumption is of course that the frequency of interaction increases social attachment. There is quite substantial evidence backing this claim. In a very exhaustive psychological review on social attachment Baumeister and Leary (1995) for instance conclude that "...several other studies suggest how little it takes (other than frequent contact) to create social attachment". In an economic experiment Glaeser et al. (2000) for instance show that the time since a …rst meeting between two interaction partners has a signi…cant positive e¤ect on the amount of money transferred in a trust game. Brandts and Solà (2006) study the e¤ect of personal relations on distributive decisions and …nd discrimination against the subjects that are not personally known to the distributor.
The connection between the degree of acquaintance between rater and ratee or rating biases has also been discussed in the psychological literature (see for instance Cardy and Dobbins (1986) , Varma et al. (1996) , or Lefkowitz (2000) ). Most studies are either laboratory experiments with students or they lack objective measures of performance. Kingstorm and Mainstone (1985) study the connection between personal acquaintance and task acquaintance (i.e. the level of the supervisor's familiarity with the employees tasks) on ratings of sales employees. They …nd a weak positive correlation between both and rating leniency in a cross section analysis.
In our study we use panel data on performance evaluations from a call center over 4 years. The investigated subjects are call-agents whose main task is to deal with service queries over the telephone from clients who bought technical products. We have information about the average handling time (AHT), so-called Transaction Monitoring (TM) scores and the days of absence. In the Transaction Monitoring process the quality of the agent's interaction with the client is assessed on the basis of a narrow de…ned requirement catalogue by an external monitor who is not the direct supervisor. Controlling for these performance measures, helps us to discover systematic distortions in the evaluation process. Moreover, as we have an (unbalanced) panel, the performance of a number of employees in the sample is evaluated by di¤erent supervisors at di¤erent points in time and also groups are rearranged frequently, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity in agents' and supervisor's characteristics.
Our results indeed show a signi…cant negative in ‡uence of unit size on performance evaluations. In smaller groups where the personal contact between supervisor and employee is closer, the overall subjective assessment grades are signi…cantly better. Furthermore we …nd that employees who have been assessed by the same supervisor before, on average receive better ratings than colleagues of the same tenure and who attained the same transaction monitoring scores.
to identify an e¤ect of social ties. For example Abbink et al. (2006) investigate an e¤ect of social ties in an experimental micro…nance experiment. They …nd a more generous behaviour in repayment decisions between group members in a "friends"-treatment.
The remainder of the paper in organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the institutional background and section 3 with the empirical approach. We present the results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Background
We investigate personnel data of call center employees from an international company with headquarter in Germany. The data covers one german subsidiary between 2004 and 2007. The business activities of the company are organized in departments, of which we observe a total of 12 in the full sample over the years.
2 The company o¤ers call center services to large business customers who outsource their technical support. Due to organizational and contractual changes in the client structure, not all departments exist over the …ve years: only two exist in the whole …ve years, three departments in four years, three in three years, four in two years and three departments only in one year. 11 of these departments are so-called "Inbound"-projects receiving calls from end costumers for a client, for instance a computer production …rm, to answer technical or administrative queries. A department consists of about 1 to 2 team leaders with leadership authority, one communication coach, one ‡oor manager, several so-called second level and …rst level agents. The communication coach is responsible to train the communication skills of the agents while the ‡oor manager is planning the service schedule and therefore controlling the capacities. Second level agents are promoted …rst level agents who, while still answering calls, also serve as a link between the team leader and the …rst level agents.
The subsidiary has implemented a subjective performance evaluation system demanding an overall evaluation of every agent by the team leader once a year according to di¤erent criteria. The results of the subjective evaluation do not a¤ect monetary compensation directly but are important for instance for promotion decisions and the identi…cation of training needs. It The evaluation data is stored in an internal database with the exact time period the evaluation is referring to. Employees that just entered the company or received a negative evaluation are forced to be rated again after six months. The supervisor can rate the employee for each criterion on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 is the highest rate and 3 means "to be up to standard". Additionally every criterion is complemented by a behavioral statement. An important point is that the supervisor can access other performance measures which are stored in an internal database. These measures are collected on a monthly basis. The quality of the work is assessed by a so-called Transaction Monitoring (TM) tool. Calls are either followed by a second level agent sitting beside the monitored agent or recorded without the agent being informed. This randomly selected call is then evaluated according to a quite narrowly de…ned rating sheet and the test is passed when at least reaching 80 100% of the maximal score. The speed of work is evaluated with the so-called Average Handling Time (AHT). It describes the average time an agent needs to process a call and can be broken down to hourly scores. A third objective performance measure are the days of absence during the subjective performance evaluation period (one year).
Empirical Approach
At the end of the appraisal criterion catalogue the assessor is always asked to give an overall rating. We use this item as dependent variable throughout our analysis. The item is scaled on a 5-point likert-scale with values from 1 to 5 where 5 indicates the best value "far above requirements" and 1 indicates the lowest value "far below requirements".
We estimate the following baseline speci…cation:
where Y it is the individual rating of an agent i who is evaluated at time t. X it represents the main indicators for social attachment which will be explained in the following and the vector V it measures the objective performance measures for worker i in period t. I it are further worker characteristics and t year dummies. As the dependent variable is measured on an ordinal scale we additionally run ordered probit regressions. 3 To control for unobserved heterogeneity in personal characteristics of the employees we also estimate individual …xed and random e¤ects models. We apply two main indicators for social proximity in our analysis. First, group size is measured by the quantity of evaluations an assessor conducted per year. For every supervisor the absolute number of evaluations conducted per year is summed up in a variable called "Assessments per year". Secondly, a dummy variable is introduced indicating an appraisal being conducted by the same supervisor the year before as a proxy for the time of acquaintance.
Performance measures used as control variables are the average result of the Transaction Monitoring, the standardized sum of the absence days during the period covered by the subjective performance evaluation, and two dummies measuring the Average Handling Time. These two dummies are generated as follows: One of the dummies indicates that the AHT value of an agent was below 90% of the mean AHT within his group in the considered year and the other one indicates that the AHT exceeded the mean value. The reason for this structure is that the company's objective is to make optimal use of capacity by having shorter calls but also to provide an acceptable quality. Other control variables cover individual-speci…c characteristics like age, age 2 , tenure and sex and unit-speci…c attributes such as average age in the unit, or the percentage of women per unit. Additionally a dummy variable is included indicating whether a supervisor was conducting an appraisal for the …rst time in his or her career.
of the objective performance measures (that are partially measured on a daily basis) depend on the speci…c evaluation period we dropped the observations with missing details about the exact period, so that we reduced the sample to the observations complete in this respect. After these selection processes our sample consists of 520 employee-year observations. These agents are in total employed in 12 di¤erent departments and are evaluated by 18 di¤erent supervisors. The 520 observations cover 386 di¤erent individuals that have been assessed one to three times during the 4 years. There are very high turnover rates in the call center. Hence, only 33:7% of these individuals have been evaluated several times. Descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented in table A1 in the appendix.
Results
We …rst look at the distribution of appraisal grades for small (less than 15 agents assessed by the supervisor per year), middle-sized (between 15 and 30 agents) and large groups (more than 30 agents) as shown in Regression results regarding the e¤ects of the number of assessed employees are shown in table 2 reporting robust standard errors clustered for teams. Column (1) shows the OLS regression without controlling for objective performance measures. The coe¢ cient for the variable counting the number of assessments per supervisor-year is negative and signi…cant at the 10%-level. In speci…cation (2) the four objective performance measures are added. The coe¢ cient of the assessments per year becomes stronger and achieves a signi…cance level of 1%. Hence, in line with our hypothesis appraisals in smaller units are indeed more lenient. Ordered probit regressions con…rm this result (columns (3) and (4) of table 2).
OLS
Ordered Probit Overall appraisal The coe¢ cients of the objective performance measures show the expected signs. High Transaction Monitoring results positively a¤ect the overall assessment, while the days of absence have signi…cantly negative impact. The dummy variables for the AHT score boundaries have the expected sign but is insigni…cant. Having an assessor who has never rated before has also the anticipated negative impact (signi…cant on the 1%-Level in columns (2), (3) and (4)) in the estimations.
While we consider it quite unlikely that team size is endogenous as it is mainly driven by client demands and we control for several measurable aspects of performance, our data allows us to go one step further and investigate panel data to control for further unobservable heterogeneity (such as individual abilities not captured by the objective performance measures). The results of …xed and random-e¤ects regressions are reported in table 3 and con…rm the previous observations in all speci…cations. The model predicts than a speci…c employee switching from a smaller to a larger group will receive an inferior evaluation even if his true performance is una¤ected.
To evaluate the economic signi…cance of the e¤ects, we additionally conducted a probit analysis reporting the marginal e¤ect of group size on the probability of receiving a good evaluation (i.e. receiving a either a 4 or 5). We include dummy variables indicating the particpation in a small (< 15) or a large group ( 30). As can be seen in table A2 in the appendix the probability of receiving a good grade is about 5:4% higher when being part of a small team in comparison to the reference group of a middle-sized team while there is no signi…cant di¤erence between large and middle sized teams.
To investigate our second hypothesis we now analyze the e¤ect of a repeated assessment by the same supervisor on performance evaluations. We therefore created a dummy variable indicating whether the employee has been evaluated by the same assessor before. Table 4 shows the distribution of grades dependent on whether there has been a previous assessment by the same supervisor. Note that 5:08% of those employees who have been assessed by the same supervisor before receive a good grade of 4 while only 2:88% of those who had been appraised by a di¤erent supervisor before receive this grade. Furthermore, supervisors who rate an employee for the …rst time give the bad grade 2 more than 5 times as often as supervisors who have evaluated the same employee before.
It is also interesting to compare changes in grades for given employees: When being appraised by the same supervisor a grade improvement occurs twice as often as when the supervisor has changed (10:71% in comparison to Table 4 : Distribution of appraisal grades by "repeated assessment"
5:21%). On the other hand, the probability that an employee gets a worse grade is three times as high in case of an assessment by a di¤erent supervisor (14:58% in comparison to 5:36%).
Of course, the repeated assessment dummy may capture also simple experience e¤ects. Hence, it is very important to control for …rm tenure. The results of OLS and ordered probit regressions are reported in table 5. Columns (1) and (4) contain the results for speci…cations without further performance measures while we control for these measures in speci…cations (2) and (5). We …nd that employees receive a better grade when they are repeatedly assessed by the same supervisor as compared to employees of the same tenure attaining the same performance measure values who are assessed by a di¤er-ent supervisor.
OLS Ordered Probit
Overall appraisal The two further speci…cations (3) and (6) additionally include a "new assessor"-dummy indicating that a supervisor had no prior experience with evaluations. Note that this reduces the e¤ect size for the repeated appraisal. While the e¤ect of repeated appraisals becomes insigni…cant in the OLS regressions it stays weakly signi…cant in the ordered probit regression. Hence at least part of the e¤ect is driven by the tendency of inexperienced supervisors to assign worse grades. But again, it seems very important here to control for unobserved heterogeity. To see that, note that the comparison of the results with and without the objective performance measures shows an increase of the tenure coe¢ cient in columns (2) and (5). Due to on the job human capital formation we would usually expect a better performance of employees with higher tenure and hence a decreasing tenure coe¢ cient when objective performance measured are included. Interestingly, we observe the opposite pattern as the tenure coe¢ cient gets even stronger. This can be best understood when considering the two graphics in …gure A1 and A2 which illustrate average Transaction Monitoring scores and days of absence per year of tenure. The TM results do not increase with tenure and even fall beginning with the …fth year of tenure and the days of absence consistently increase in the data set. These developments have two di¤erent reasons. First of all, the jobs in the call center are typically regarded as stressful, hence absence rates increase and performance seems to go down. In addition, there are selection e¤ects as able …rst level agents will be promoted to the second level and poorly performing agents leave the company.
Hence, to control for unobserved heterogeneity and selection e¤ects we therefore again ran random and …xed e¤ects regressions (see table 6 ).
Random E¤ects Fixed E¤ects
Overall appraisal Control variables include age, ageš, year dummies, the share of women and average team age.
p < 0:01, p < 0:05, p < 0:1 Table 6 : Repeated Appraisals: Random and …xed e¤ects
The repeated appraisal dummy is again signi…cantly positive in all …xed e¤ects speci…cations. Hence, a given employee at a given point in time indeed obtains better grades when he is evaluated by a supervisor he is familiar with as compared to a situation in which he is evaluated by a di¤erent supervisor.
Finally, it could be argued that supervisors who have evaluated the same person before, can more accurately appraise the work of the employee as they are able to observe them over a longer time. However, while this may lead to more di¤erentiated grades it should not lead to grades which are better on average such as we observed. Moreover, as shown in table A4, the standard deviation of assessments by the same supervisor is smaller rather than larger which also makes such a mechanism unplausible.
The results concerning both hypotheses are similar when we include both proxies for social ties, the unit size and the dummy for the repeated appraisal by the same supervisor as is shown in table A3. But the e¤ects of team size are more robust than those of repeated appraisals.
Conclusion
We investigated possible distortions in subjective performance appraisals and found evidence for the hypothesis that subjective performance is biased when there is a closer social proximity between supervisor and subordinates. Our analysis shows that the size of the work unit has a negative impact on grades in subjective performance evaluations. Controlling for objective performance measures employees in large units received worse evaluations than employees in smaller units. We also observed that employees who have been evaluated by the same supervisor before receive better ratings. Both results also hold in …xed and random e¤ects regression such that a given person with a given experience and performance measures receives lower ratings when moving to a larger team or when getting a new supervisor.
Our results indicate that …rms must be cautious when using performance appraisal results to compare employees across departments. There is a bias in favor of employees from smaller groups and employees who have been acquainted with the supervisor for longer periods of time. These e¤ects have to be taken into account when decisions on promotions or layo¤s are made forcing a …rm to rank employees across departments. 2 , year dummies, the share of women and average team age p < 0:01, p < 0:05, p < 0:1 
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